With a substantive focus on East Asia, my research examines how historical rivalry which encompasses not only geopolitical competition, but also deeply rooted sociocultural antagonism affects relations between states. In these contexts, national identity narratives directly incorporate a long-running history of interstate competition, framing popular understandings of “who we are” through accounts of “how we suffered” at the hands of a foreign rival. I argue that executives seek to capitalize on the identity-based threat such rivals evoke by strategically pursuing aggressive, but non-militarized foreign policy in disputes directly tied to the bilateral history of conflict in times of domestic insecurity. In these disputes, foreign postures challenge territory, symbols, or events central to core national identity narratives. Drawing on interdisciplinary scholarship on historical memory and national identity, I argue that citizens perceive such foreign behavior as a direct affront to nationhood, generating strong threat perceptions and fervent, anti-foreign nationalism well before tensions become militarized. Diverting attention away from problems at home and toward injustices of the past, leaders leverage historical memory, national identity, and enduring rivalry to heighten perceived threat, mobilize anti-foreign nationalism, and consolidate political support.
Hartman, E., Hazlett, C., & Sterbenz, C. (2024). Kpop: A kernel balancing approach for reducing specification assumptions in survey weighting. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A: Statistics in Society. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrsssa/qnae082
Sterbenz, C., Trager, R. “Autonomous Weapons and Coercive Threats.” Pulse, Feb. 2019, website special topic, “AI in Strategic Context: Development Paths, Impacts, and Governance.” Available here
While a vast literature in international relations has studied recurrent patterns of international conflict between pairs of rival states, less focus has been devoted to examining how a history of bilateral contest shapes relations in more peaceful times. Additionally, existing research has largely centered elite-level geopolitical competition, giving little attention to the role of engrained anti-foreign animosity among the domestic public in perpetuating rivalry. My research addresses these gaps. I focus on the unique set of sociocultural rivalries which foment mutual distrust, resentment, and animosity among their counterpoised domestic publics and examine a diverse array of aggressive foreign policy behaviors that occur far more frequently than rare instances of overt war. I connect the literature in international security on diversionary war to the expansive cross-disciplinary literature on historical memory, nationalism, and national identity, asking: when and where do leaders invoke histories of international rivalry to emphasize foreign threats or disrupt bilateral relations?
In answer to this question, I build upon a large literature on diversionary war and argue that executives often strategically exploit aggressive foreign policy against such rivals to consolidate political support in times of severe domestic insecurity. In particular, I assert that vulnerable leaders draw upon historical memory of prior suffering at the hands of a former foe in a special set of historical disputes concerning both territory and appropriate remembrance. In these disputes, foreign postures challenge territory, symbols, or events central to core national narratives of collective suffering. I draw on interdisciplinary scholarship on historical memory and national identity to argue that citizens perceive such foreign behavior as a direct affront to nationhood, threatening both national sovereignty and pride. This, in turn, generates strong threat perceptions and riles fervent, anti-foreign nationalism well before tensions become militarized. Consequently, I expect insecure leaders to highlight aggression in historical disputes against long-time rivals through rhetorical, diplomatic and economic means that fall short of out-right, militarized threat, generating patriotic “rally-round-the-flag” boosts in public approval with minimal risk of escalation into costly outright conflict.
I evaluate this argument with reference to East Asia, where popular understandings of both Chinese and South Korean identity are structured around narratives of collective suffering under Imperial Japan. I take a multi-method approach, combining qualitative case studies of leader behavior with an empirical analysis of public-facing executive rhetoric about foreign affairs before and after periods of acute political vulnerability. Finally, I employ an experimental survey design to evaluate whether there is causal, micro-level evidence of the diversionary mechanism among average citizens in South Korea.
Sterbenz, C. “Nationalism, Collective Memory, and Public Support for Aggressive Foreign Policy.” Spring 2026.
Sambanis, N., Tsakonas P., Lee A., Majumdar R., Sterbenz, C., Yakir I. “Misperceiving Nationalism: Beliefs About Others’ Beliefs and Group Conformism in Foreign Policy.” Working Paper. Fall 2025.
Sterbenz, C. “Diversionary Diplomacy: Elite Rhetoric in Nationalist Standoffs.” Working Paper. Fall 2025.
Sterbenz, C. “Autocratic Power Consolidation in Times of Conflict.” Working Paper. January, 2021.
Sterbenz, C. “Conflict and the Fate of Autocratic Leaders.” Working Paper. January, 2020.